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THE NATIONAL ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION FUND NERFUND:
ACHlEVEMEN'rS, CONSTRAINTS AND PROSPECTS
Dr. (Mrs) Toyin Phillips1
This paper reviews and appraisu the National Economic Reconstruction Fund (NERFUND) which is one of
the speclallaed jinancingfacilitie, for promoting mu,11 and mMium SCille enterptisa (SM&). 11le muly nota
that gi,ven the importance of SMEs in the industrialbatio process, particularly in the tffOI of employment
gmeralion and devdopment of indigenous technolog, evaluating the effecdveness of the ,chant: is ofmajor
interest especially to inform policy analysis and chokes. 11lepaper examines the objectiva and the operational
modalilies ofNERFUND, ll1IIJ/ysQ the bnplementation problems ofthe scheme and as.,e,sa the achlevmlotls
so far and the prospects ofthe scheme.
111emulylhowed thatNERFUND'smajorroleofprovidingsoftmMium to ~tmnfioubto SMEs through
pankipating banks (P&) had b«n achieved to some atent dapite some initial con.rtraint& The major
connraints have """ the rductanu Uj banks to participate in the scheme, due to high rim tmocialed with
cmlit operatio,u ofSM&, and the "PJ1'l1ffll 6ilen« ofpolicy on risk burden Wlring6tl'tllqja.
11le muly mimled dJat NERFUND ~ IJ'j end-May 1991120 projec# worth NStu million wit&
~ tota&d over HlOO million. Approvals c ~ a wide range ofprojects nationwuk allhou(/,
disbunemenl., lagged far behind approval. Approved project6 Kffll estimated to have the potential of booadni
employment IJ'j more than 6,000 people. Despite t h e s e ~ the problems which mntiin oUl6tlJnding
include; tlte issue of risk-marin& tying of cmlit facilitia to conditioru of the ~ a l 6Uppolt agmcia;
conflict over definition oftplalifyingproject beneficu,riQ, lack ofjlaibilily In the enabling Decree, alack of
appropriate modalitia for managing NERFUND.
.
Given the commitment ofthe Federal Government to the promotion ofSM& and the ,upport ofinlemational
financial lnstitulio1Ls such a.r the ADB and the World Bank, NERFUND is e:q,t:ctetl to play a lead role In the

financing ofSMEs.
NERFUND's impact could, however, be grossly undermined if il8 management is politicised, and ifthe criteria

for project selection de-emphasfze economic consideratio,u.
INTRODUCTION
The Federal Government in the past few years, has put in place, some specialised fmancing
facilities or schemes primarily to boost small and medium scale enterprises (SMEs). The focus
on SME's is predicated on their impact and contribution to a diversified prodµctive base as
well as their catalytic effect in achieving macro objectives such as employment generation,
diffusion of economic power and promotion of indigenous technology. Small and medium
scale enterprises are particularly more conducive to the creation of more jobs per unit of naira
investment, than large enterprises. Through a i:ietwork of intricate linkages with large-scale
enterprises, they are capable of enhancing a broad production base. As important as they are

1
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in the development process, their actual contribution has been less than adequate, owing to
various institutional constraints as well as problems inherent in them.
In particular, SMEs are characterised by problems of undercapitalisation, high rate of
business failure, shortage gf skill, poor accounting stardards and restricted access to big
markets. These problems in turn, restrict their access to institutionalised credit. To alleviate
the problems of SMEs, the Federal Government, since the early 1960s has introduced various
measures to encourage. their proliferation. Measures to boost SMEs have been stepped up
over the years, with increased emphasis placed on them by the present Administration. The
President, in liis 1988 Budget Address stated that not only are SMEs "capable of generating
more employment per unit of capital input, they provide the best chance of industrialising our
rural areas". In recognition of their potential benefits as well as problems encountered by
them, the government has played a lead role in encouraging: their proliferation. Facilities or
schemes set up by the governmentto promote SMEs include the World Bank-Assisted Small
and Medium Scale Enterprises ($?t'IB)Apex Unit Loan Scllpme,the Export Stimulatiop. Loan
(ESL) Scheme, some of the programmes of the National I>iteet~ate Qf J?tployq,ient (NDE),
Central Bank of Nigeria'.s guidelines to banks on minimum aeditto begraatedtosmall-scale
enterprises, CBN RedisCQunting and Refinancing Facility· (RRF) for exporters and the
National Economic Reconstruction-Fund (NERFU@)~. Each of these facilities or schemes
has a great potential for promoting SMEs and indeed many SMEs have been able to utilise
them. The focus of this paper is the National Economic Reconstruction Fund (NERFUND),
which has been. in die news fi:equently, but whose operational modality is not well understood.
The objective of this paper therefore is to examine the achievements, constraints and prospects
·or the NERFUND. The rest of the paper is thus divided into four parts. Part I discusses the
objectives and operational modality of NERFUND. Part ll examines the constraints experienced in implementing the scheme. Part m considers the achievements so fu, as well as
prospects for the future, while part IV provides the summary and concluding remarks.
PARTI
THE OBJECTIVES AND OPERATIONAL
MODALITY OF NERFUND

1'.he Rationale For Setting Up the NERFUND
In spite of the recognition of the role of small and medium scale enterprises (SMEs) in

fostering economic development through the promotion of indigenous technology, employment-generating activities and broadening of the proouction base, the impact of N'Jgerian
SMEs on economic development has been less than desirable.~ ipajor reason for this is their
restricted access to institutionalised credit as a result of banks' perception ofSMEs as high~risk
ventures. Indeed, despite the directive of the Central Bank of N"igeria that banksgtant.aot less
than 16 per cent (up till eI\d 1989) and later a minimum of 20 per cent (from January-~).of
their total loans and advances outstanding to small enterprises, the banks granted less thatt10
per cent of their loans and advances outstanding to small enterprises during the period
1
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1980-1986. With the introduction of the Structural Adjustment Programme (S
the inevitable devaluation of the naira, many SMEs found it very difficult to
attendant high production costs as a result of high cost of imported inputs, an high rates of
interest. In addition, banks' lo.ans to SMEs tended to be short-term in nature
their portfolio structure. SMEs therefore tended to borrow short for some of eir long term
financing requirements. They also experienced restricted access to foreign exc ange.
In order to bridge the observed gap in banks' lending to SMEs, the Federal Government
set up the National Economic Reconstruction Fund (NERFUND) through th NERFUND
Decree No. 2 of 9th January, 1989.
Objectives
NERFUND is aimed at providing soft, medium to long term funds for who N"igerian owned small and medium scale enterprises. SMEs are defined as those wi cost of new
investment up to, but not exceeding Nl0 million. SMEs through NERFUND,
local and foreign loans over a period of five to ten years. Specifically, the aims
of NERFUND are to ~
(i)

correct any observed inadequacies in the provision of medium or long-t
financing
to small and medium scale industrial enterprises (SMEs), especially man cturingand
agro-allied enterprises, mining, quarrying, industrial support services,· eq .pment leasing and other ancillary projects.

(ii)

provide medium to long term loans to participating commercial and me chant banks
(PB~) for on-lending to SMEs;

(iii)

facili.:ate the provision of loans with 5-10 years maturity including a grace
years, depending on the nature of the enterprises or project; and

(iv)

provide loan in local and/or foreign cwrency depending on the funds available to
NERFUND and the project being funded.

riod of 1-3

Eligibility
The provision for eligible enterprises according to section 2 of the Decree

e that:

(i)

SMEs be 100 per cent owned by Nigerians;

(ii)

SMEs are regarded as those with fixed a~ets plus cost of new investment (land
excluded) not exceedingNlO million (an upward review of this ceiling is currently under
consideration);

(iii)

In the case of a manufacturing project, not less than 40 per cent oi the raw materials
are locally sourced;
and

(iv)

A participating Bank (PB) has accepted on behalf of the SME to assume credit risk.

Once the management of NERFUND is satisfied that the ~ligibility criteria are met and
that an acceptable loan agreement between an SME and the PB has been drawn up and
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deposited with NERFUND, funds are expected to be released at the agreed intervals and
consequent on a written request by the PB for funds disbursement.
Geographic Spread of NERFUND Projects
,

Projects located in the rural areas are to be accorded priority. Accordingly, the dissemination of information on NERFUND resources and activities is expected to be carried out at
the local government levei while states' Commissioners of F'mance are expected to coordinate
activities pertaining to the utilisation of NERFUND's resources. Beneficiaries of NERFUND
are NOT expected to be considered on a quota basis.
Administration and management of NERFUND
The NERFUND secretariat is responsible for the disbursement to and recovery from PBs
of all loans made to PBs for on-lending to enterprises and projects approved. Unless a PB
has pre-paid all the amounts due OD a loan before the scheduled repayment date, NERFUND
shall notify the Central Bank of Nigeria of the amounts outstanding and the account(s) of the
bank(s) involved shall be debited. Exceptions are where the NERFUND agrees to rescheduling a particular loan to a PB. To ensure that loans are promptly and effectively disbursed and
managed, NERFUND's resources are managed by a committee, which initially comprised of:
li)

The Federal Minister ofF'mance & Econ. Development or his
representative

-Chairman

(ii)

The Governor of the Central B~ of Nigeria or his representative

-Member

(iii)

The General Manager/Chief Executive of NERFUND

-Member

(iv)

A representative of the Commercial Banks

-Member

(v)

A representative of the Merchant Banks

-Member

(vi)

A representative of the Development Banks

-Member

and
(vii)

A representative of the Fed. Minister of Fin. & Econ. DevelopJ:llent. -Secretary.
The three representatives of the banks were to be appointed by the President on the
recommendation of the Minister of F'mance.

Recently however, the board composition was restructured to provide for greater flexibility
in management. The use of banks' representatives is being de-emphasised with the inauguration in February 1991, by the Minister of FinaAce and Economic Development, of a six-man
l>oard, with members drawn from varied background and with different areas of interests and
specialisation. The board is headed by a Chairman (not a government official) whilst a
managing director is th~ chief executive of NERFUND. Other board members are mainly
from the private sector.
A NERFUND Monitoring Office headed by the chief executive, overseas the day-to-day
ope.ration of the NER::?1'Jl\1D.
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NERFUND's Funding Sources
According to section 8 of NERFUND Decree No. 2 of 1989, the sources of fund are: (1)
The Federal Government of ~igeria- N200 million;(2) The Central Bank of N'igeria- NlOO
million; and (3) Counterpart funding from the World Bank, the African Development Bank,
export credit agencies, governments, banks and other organisations acceptable to the NERFUND Committee.
Currently, NERFUND's resource base comprises of three components:
(i)

N300 million from the Federal Government of N':ageria (including Central Bank's
contributio~) as stated in the enabling decree, of which N140 million has been paid up;

·(ii)

$230 million from the African Development Bank (ADB) of which $130 million was
recently approved;
and

(iii)

$50 million from the government of C7.echoslovakia.

In order to meet foreign obligations promptly, the chie~ executive of NERFUND is
expected to procure the foreign exc1tange required to service NERFUND's foreign currency
loans. NERFUND is also expected to hold such foreign exchange acquired in income-bearing
securities and repay loans, as and when due. NERFUND, as stipulated in the enabling decree,
shall not receive any government subventions except as provided by those responsible for the
funding. Accordingly, the scheme is expected to be self-financing. NERFUND is to service its
loans and meet all expenditure from its own resources.
Disbursements of funds are subject to compliance with the rules and regulations attached
to a particular source of fund. For example, the African Development Bank (ADB) non-oil
export-stimulation loan (ESL) is for funding foreign exchange requ,irements for imported
inputs for non-oil export production. The Czechoslovakian line of credit is primarily for
funding capital goods import from C7.echoslovakia, with the beneficiary paying upfront 15 per
cent of the f.o.b. value of each contract amount. The naira component is to fund SMEs geared
towards local sourcing of inputs.

Modalities
The NERFUND reserves the right to disburse funds on behalf of PBs and the banks'
customers, directly to the suppliers of machinery and/or equipment. The payment for
machinery imports by NERFUND counts as part of the loan. Payments include port handling
charges, port development charges and import duties. The purpose is to ensure that imported
machinery are brought in on a timely basis, since some letters of credit take up to eight months
before they become effective. NERFUND usually undertakes machinery imports so that there
would be no room for ~ds diversion by SMEs, with regards to imported machinery, nor
would machinery be left unattended at ports, because funds were not released on a timely
basis by the PBs or because of other real or imagined bottlenecks.
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Accessing NERFUND Loans
Accessing NERFUND loans is fairly straightforward. A project promoter applies to a bank
of bis/her choice and indicates interest in obtaining NERFUND loans. SMEs are not expected
to approach NERFUND directly. The applicarit bank would evaluate eligible enterprises and
projects and approve loans in accor~ce with its regular practice. Banks are respoDS1'ble for
disbursements, monitotjng and recovery of loans. The banks determine with the project
sponsors, the amounts required in the various currencies. Also, the supplier(s) must be
identified. Thereafter, approval-in-principle of NERFUND is obtained by the participating
bank.
NERFUND is expected to release funds at the agreed intervals and on the written request
of a participating bank (PB) to the machinery/equipmentsupplier(s), or in some cases, to the
PB for onward lending to the SME. The PBs on their part are expected to ensure prompt loan
repayments on or before the due dates: Commercial or market risks involved in any loan
granted under the programme are to be borrie by PBs.
It is the primary responsibility of the PBs to ensure the adequacy of working capital by
SMEs throughout the life oftheNERFUND loan. In cases where NERFUND·didnot disburse
directly to the machinery and equipment suppliers, each PB shall disburse funds to approved
enterprises or projects not later tbao three wnr)tjnr days of release of the funds by NERFUND
to the PB.
Each PB is ~..cted to set up a unit or section, specially for SMEs to provide credit
extension services. Such a unit is expected to be staffed by financial analysts, engineers, ·
economists and other experts. Copies of loan agreements showing disbursement and repayment schedules are expected to be deposited by each PB~ with the NERFUND.
Interest Rates Payable
The interest rates chargeable on funds obtained from NERFUNi> are expected to be
relatively lower than commercial rates in order to ease SMEs access to credit. The rates
chargeable on naira loans shall be slightly lower~ the market rates prevailing in the country
and shall be fixed during the duration of the loan. The rates chargeable by NERFUND to PBs
are limited.to 1 per cent above NERFUND's cost of borrowing the parti~ fund. PBs are·
allowed a spread of not more than 4 per cent over their cost of fund Foreign curr~cy loans
are to carry variable interest rates depending on the source of the foreign loan and the terms
of agreement concluded with NERFUND. Specifically, the cost ofNERFUND's foreign loans
is currently9.5 per cent and it charges PBs 105 per cent for such loans. For naira-denominated
loans, NERFUND charges Central Bank's minimum rediscount rate (MRR) plus 1 per cent
margin. Up till the end of 1990, a beneficiary obtained NERFUND naira loans at 235 per
cent. With the down~d revision in ·interest rates since January 1991,, beneficiaries of
NERFUND loans pay between 19.0 and 19.5 per cent. The naira interest rate for each loan is
expected to be. fixed for the duration of the loan. For loans disbursed in foreign currency,
payments of interest and principal instalni~nts due, shall be the naira equivalent at the
prevailing (selling) rate at the FEM unless otherwise stipulated. The SMEs however bear the
foreign exchange risks.
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In general, NERFUND monitors banks' interest rate spread on the loans to ensure that
they comply with the rules and regulations on making credit accessible to SMEs.

NERFUND's Funds and Credit Ceiling
Loans granted under the NERFUND scheme with NERFUND's funds are exempted from
credit ceiling stipulated by the CBN. NERFUND's funds are also exempted from deposit
reserve requirements.
PART II
CONSTRAINTS IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF

THE NERFUND SCHEME
The NERFUND Scheme was relatively slow in taking off due to a number of constrain~
that emerged shortly after the scheme was introduced. The problematic.issues centre on (1)
risk-sharing (2) access to individual sources of fund within NERFUND, (3) definition of
qualifying projects, (4) problems inherent in SMEs themselves, (5) confusion/disagreement
o~r the modalities and management of NERFUND by various pressure groups and (6)
rigidities in the enabling decree.
(1)

Risk-Sharing

The banks are generally displeased at having to bear all the credit risk involved in financing
SMEs. As loans fall due, a participating bank (PB) ·is expected to repay NERFUND, failing'
which the Central Bank would automatically debit the PB's account with it, irrespective of the
ability of a beneficiary to pay maturing obligations. The banks maintain that there is nowhere
in the world where 100 per cent debt recovery by banks is attained. They claim that the
perceived socio-economic benefits of fundingSMEsare far less than the credit risks theymight
inevitably have to bear. They also argue that since the government is committed to promoting
SMEs, the risk-taking should be the joint responsibility on the part of the banks·and the
government. The overall result is that because the banks are the primary obligors, they were
over-cautious initially in granting NERFUND loans t~ SMEs, particularly because of the short
term nature of their portofolio structure. The...PBs were thus relatively slow at the onset in
tapping NERFUND's resources.
(2)

Restricted Access

SMEs sourcing funds from the ADB's component of NERFUND are req~ed to source
their input from the 76-member countries of the ADB. Even though the technologies of many
of these countries are basically high standard, this restriction limits the scope of an SME that
requires imports from non-member countries of the ADB such as Taiwan.
(3)

Conflicts Over Definition of Qualifying Projects

The $50 million line of credit from the Crechoslovakian government is technically inaccessible to Nigerian SMEs, because the Czechoslovakian Government defined an SME as one
with a minimum project cost of USS3.0 million, whereas the NERFUND Decree puts NlO
million (about $1 million) as the upper limit for the project cost of an SME. Moreover, an
SME is required to source its machinery from Czechoslovakia a.s well as make a 15 per cent
down-payment for import.
1
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Although recently, the C7.echoslovakian government yielded to redefine an SME within
the N"igerian context, using$3 milliouas the upper limit instead the minimum earlier stipulated,
the C7.echoslovakian line of credit is still untapped because of the CORdition thaf upfront, some
downpayment should be made.
. (4)

Problems of the SMEs

Derivation of maximum benefits from NERFUND is constrained by the problems experienced by SMEs themselves. Many of them are unable to put forward the minimum
requirement pf twenty five per cent of the cost of the projects. The result is that even when a
project has been approved, disbursement fails to take place on a timely basis, while the cost
of the project could have escalated in an inflationary environment. .
. Also, SMEs are beset by other problems such as avemon to ownership dilution and hence
undercapitalisation, aversion to information disclosure; poor accounting.standards, shortage
of skill; badly prepared feasibility reP.9rts on projects to be epibarked upon, jqadequate
collateral and res~ed access to the export market. These problems restrict SMEs access to
NERFUND and to.some other schemes set out to promote them.
(5)

Confusion/Disagreement over the Modalities and Management of NERFUND

Misleading information through some of the news media presentedNERFUND as another
cake-shariqg programme. When it appeared that this was not to be, criticisms were rife at the
early state of implementing the scheme because many small and medium scale entrepreneurs
were reported to be disenchanted by banks' relatively slow response to their credit needs, as
well as by the high rates of interest. Som.e entrepreneurs anticipated a "free-for-all" soft loan
package. Whe~ it-became clear that the SMBs had tp access NERFUND through banks,
various prote.sts against the· modality of the scheme surfaced. Some of-these protests were
organised, others were not.
One of the major critics of the NERFUND has been the National Association of Small
Scale Industrialists (NASSI), whose spokesmen argued that NASSI should be represented on
NERF'UND's board of directors, since NASSI, according to them, understands the problems
of small scale industrialists best. Other critics {until the board was recently i:econstituted)
.blamed the government for entrusting the management of NERFUND to a "group of ~ ·
._ servants". It is not the purpose of this paper to suggest who. should be on the board ·of
' NERFUND. The important thing is that competent people (whether from-the public or private
sector) direct the implementation of the scheme and such persons should not be saddled with _
conflicts of interest. The issue of NASSl's representation on NERFUND's board implies that
a beneficiary, NASSI in this case, decides how much it obtains from the fund and in what form.
Would NASSl's representation on the board yield overall, net benefit for the implementatuion
of the scheme? There appears no easy answer to this ques~on because whatever arguments
one puts forward hete, they could only be conjectural.
NASSI ancJsome others also disagree withNERFUND's definition of 81\SME. The current
upper limit of N10 n,tlllion on project cost (not size of enterprise) implies that many ~medium-to-large" scale enterprises ~ benefit frotn the scheme thereby crowding out the very small
industrialists; A counter argument however is that the scheme was set up for "small" as well
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as "medium" scale enterprises and since a clear cnt definition between small. and medium is
not given under.the NERFUND funding arrangements, the NERFUND's secretariat and the
PBs have a free hand to decide which enterprises qualify. Since the pro~on of some collateral
is a prerequisite for most PBs before they sponsor a project qualified for NERFUND's
support, it is not difficult to surmise that more "-medium", than"~ scale" businesses would
be financed from NERFUND's resources.
Other criticisms focus on the modality of NERFUND. Some argue that the NERFUND
should have been set up ~ a: bank and not just a funding mechanism. While ·this may be an
attractive proposition, there are the cost implications of setting up such a bank with branches
established on a nation-wide basis. Apart from the fact that there are already some specialised
banks for small and medium scale enterprises-the Nigerian Bank for Commerce and Industry·
(NBCI) for example, the cost implicatio~ on a nation- wide basis may not justify such a
demand. Another issue is small scale industrialists' disenchantment with some banks. At the
inception of the scheme, it was mooted by some of them that the NERFUND should blacklist
banks that had "frustrated" small and medium scale industrialists in the past. Proposals on
how this could be effected however, were not specified.
(6)

Rigidities In the Enabling Decree

.There are what appears· to be unnecessary details in the enabling decree. Such details
include (a) specification of the number of days a PB would disburse funds~ a project, (b)
definition of eligible projects without a provision for inflationary factors over the years, (c)
specification of interest rate spread and numerous other details: Although thes~ ,regidities
have not seriously hindered the operation of the scheme, it is believed that many of the details
should be ~unged from the decree. The detailed operational modalities should be in the
guidelines of the NERFUND Management, while the decree shQuld provide mainly the
regulatory framework and broad guidelines for the sucessful implementation of the scheme.
By and large, the NERFUND scheme has continued to be criticised by some small-scale
industrialists, because the operational modalities are at variance with their own perception of
how the scheme should be managed. Indeed, the NASSI would want a scheme managed by
them and for them.
The numerous criticisms contributed to the slow pace with which the scheme commenced,
as they were uncertainties as to whether some-changes would be effected in the operational
modalities of the scheme in line with some of the criticisms. Although some changes have since
been introduced such as reconstitution of the board to de-emphasize banks' representation,
and redefinition of qualifying projects with regards to the Czechoslovakian line of credit, a
review of the enabling decree to provide greater flexibility, is yet to be carried out. This and
other issues notwithstanding, the objectives for setting up the NERFUND remain as valid as
when the scheme was first conceptualised.
PART III

ACHIEVEMENTS AND PROSPECTS
Owing to the constraints highlighted in the preceding sectiqn, NERFUND received on the
average, only 3 project applications per month between September 1989 (when it commenced
its activities) and January 1990. With a growing awareness about the potentials of the scheme
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in promoting SMEs, and realising that certain components of the NERFUND were readily
accessible, the SMEs and the banks stepped up their recourse to NERFUND's facilities.
Between January and july 1990 therefore, PBs submitted on the average, not less thant 12
applications per month for project funding. Since then, the number of application per month
has steadily increased.
Owing to the relative newness of the scheme it is perhaps too early to make pronouncements on projects funded and their perceived impact on the economy. Indeed, due to the grace
period of 1-3 years, most NERFUND loans are not yet due for repayment. The achi~ements
of NERFUND therefore can only be ascertained at this stage, by the information on the
number of participating banks, approved and commissioned projects· and disbursements by
NERFUND.
.
NERFUND represents a major break-through in the provision of funds for SMEs. Its
major focus of facilitating the rehabilitation of viable but ailing manufacturing enterprises
caught in the throes of some of the unintended side effects of the Structural Adjustment
Programme (SAP) is to be highly commended. This is because prospective investors are bound
to use existing enterprises as their yardstick, before they venture into new investments. The
existence of many ailli,lg firms is bo~d to be a disincentive to prospective investors. Hence,
the resuscitation of viable but termporarily troubled manufacturing firms by NERFUND is a
vital contribution to the process of economic recovery. The provision of concessioDar)' long
term loans in both local and foreign currency to such enterprises marks a significant contribution by NERFUND to industrial devclopment.
Participating Banks
The growing confidence in. the scheme could be said to have influenced the growth in the .
number of participating banks from very few in the first six months of the commencement of
the scheme to 96 as at May 1991. The active PBs however are less than half of those listeA
even though the number of active banks has continued to grow.
Approvals and Disbursements
. At the beginning of 1990 NERFUND projected that it would .approve for funding, a total.
of 200 projects. By early August 1990 however, only 61 projects with N315 million had been
approved for funding, out of which 13 had begun to draw on available funds. Total disburs•
ments early in August 1990 comprised US$7.5 million plus N3.6 million. Judged by the actual
number of projects approved as against what was planned for, NERFtJND could be said to
have performed below its target. One of the major reasons for this is the banks' role in
NERFUND's programme. NERFUND cannot authorise the banks to accept projects. Hence
NERFUND in this regard,_is on the receiving end.
As at end May 1991 however, NERFUND's approvals and disbursements had increased
substantially. Projects for which approvals were granted numbered 120. The total value of
projects approved amounteq to N504.87 millfun as at end May 1991 and the projects cut
beverages, wood and wood products, rubber,
accross various categories including food
textile, chemical products, glass and glass products, natural minerals, pharmaceuticals, paper,
plastic and leather products. The projects span virtually all the states of the Federation and

and
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Abuja, as indicated in Table 1, which provides a summary of the projects approved on state
basis.
Employment generation is a major spin-off of NERFUND's activities. The projects
approved as at the end May 19.91 are expected to boost employment by 6,254 as indicated in
Table 1.
NERFUND's disbursements in both local and foreign currency as at end May 1991 are
presented in Table 2. Due to NERFUND's monitoring activities, the stage of implementation
of the various projects are mown, as stated in Table 2. This is crucial, particularly for effective
assessment of NERFUND's activities as to how funds disbursed have been utilised and
whether or not the projects have been commissioned.
At at the end ofMay 1991, disbursements had been made for only 41 out of the 120 projects.
approved. This indicates that disbursement was only in respect of 34 per cent of total projects
approved. Also, only20 banks were involved in the disbursements so far :The wide gap between
approved projects and those for which disbursements were made is a major cause for concern.
The inability of the banks to satisfy some ofNERFUND's conditions has been adduced as one
of the major reasons for the wide gap.
NERFUND's performance hinges critically on the banks' ability to discharge their obligations, which in turn depends on the beneficiaries' capability to· meet minimum requirements.
As a result, it is difficult to criticise NERFUND of certain shortcomings since it does not deal
directly with the applicants.
As at the end of May 1991, applications for NERFUND's loans exceeded 3,000. While
some of these may not be worth the paper on which they were written, there is n,o doubt that
the demand for funds by SMEs is indeed very high. Going by the number of projects approved
as at the end of May 1991 i.e. 120 compared with the target of 200 as at the end 1990, and
judging by the value of approvals so far as indicated in Table 2, NER~'s contribution to
SME financing could be adjudged as quite substantial, though inadequate in the face of huge
demand for financing, by many SMEs. Available information on similar scemes for financing
SMEs however indiciates that the tempo of NERF.UND's activities is relatively high given
some of the initial constraints experienced in implementing the scheme. ·
There is no doubt that NERFUND has begun to achieve its primary objective of providing
soft, long-term loans to SMEs.
Prospects
Not having a crystal ball, the prospects of NERFUND can only be based on its present
achievements and what one perceives as its ability to reach many SMEs in the future.
It achievements as discussed in the preceding section demonstrate that the scheme has a
great potential for accellerating the industrialisation process through SMEs. Alth()1,1gh NERFUND funds are not distributed on a quota basis, the geographic spread is encouraging. The
indications are that in the future, not only will all states of the Federation and Abuja benefit
from the scheme, the scope will be much wider. The scheme is also expected to promote
industrial linkage through industries heavily reliant on local inputs.
Limiting factors that may however stall the realisation of this objective are (1) a drying-up
of funds for the scheme, (2) inability to reduce the 100 per cent risk currently borne by the
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banks and (3) lack of commitment on the part of the banks. The fear of shortage·of funds may
however not materialise, because the present Administration is committed to SME financing.
Also, a number of international institutions have indicated their support for the scheme and
may continue to provide such support until the economy fully rebounds. The ADB has recently
approved US$130 million loan to NERFUND.
With respect to the problematic issue of risk-sharing, discussions have reached an advanced stage whereby an insurance ·package by NICON is expected to make PBs bear only
about 75 per cent of the credit risk. The NICON-NERFUND Guarantee Scheme is expected
to induce more banks to accomodate ~MEs. Also arrangements are being worked out to use
machinery imports as part of SMEs collateral requirements. Some banks are also expected to
undertake equity interest in some of the SMEs.
The CzechOslovakian line of credit however, is still untapped. It should be realised that the
major objectives of providing the funds are to promote exports from Czechoslovakia and
facilitate turn-key investments in Nigeria. These objectives imply relatively large-scale projects
as earlier defined by the Czechoslovakian government. The issue of 15 per cent down-payment
on machinery imports from Czechoslovakia is yet to be resolved.
NERFUND's future prospects depend on the banks' commitment to project Federal
Government's aspirations of ~ SMEs as a tool for industrialisation. While s'otne of the
banks are fully committed, it is difficult to discern the nature of commitment of others. There
is no doubt that the banks' profit maximisation motive may not always tally with Federal
Governments' aspirations, hence the need to consider further incentives for the banks or else·
reduce their role in NERFUND's performance.
In order to whittle down some of the constraints of the SMEs, the management of
NERFUND has begun to work out the modalities for assistingSMEs in their feasibility studies.
Specifically, the plan is that NERFUND, in addition to banks' assessment would advise the
banks about the suitability of projects. This would be a radical departure from the practire
where the banks w~e the sol~ conduits through_ which approved proposals got to NERFUND.
There are also arrangements by NERFUND to beef up its "data bank" on raw materials
a~ailability and utilisation. It interacts closely with the Raw Materials Research and Develop-.
ment Council (RMRDC) in this regard.
The operation of the NERFUND scheme has demonstrated a great deal of flexioility in
responding to the requirements of SMEs. For example, although its major focus is the
provision of long term loans, the clamour by industrialists for working capital loans is now
being accommodated by the NERFUND.
The potentials are enormous and the perceived benefits far:-reaching for attaining macroeconomic objectives such as
of indigenous technology
. employment generation, development
.
and industrial development. The seemingly bright prospects however may be dimmed if
projects are no longer appraised on strict, economic criteria.
Given the focus of the NERFUND, the flexibility in the implementation of the scheme and
the support of international financial institution, NERFUND constitutes a critical channel in
the promotion of SMEs and consequently in the industrialisation of the country.

Phillips
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The Role of the Central Bank of N'tgeria
The role of the Central Bank of Nigeria is to ensure that NERFUND achieves it major
objective of providing medium to long-term financing to SMEs eff~ely and efficiently. This
would help in accelerating productive activities in agro-allied, manuafacturing and ancillary
businesses.
In particular, The Central Bank of N'igeria has been .active in encouraging other international institutions te beef yp NERFUND's resources. There is a need however to monitor
from time to time, the performance of NERFUND, banks' response to NERFUND and
growth in credit .arising from NERFUND's activities. Since the NERFUND credits are
exempted. from the. overall credit ceiling, effective monitoring by the CBN would be imperative to ensure that credit expansion.through NERFUND is streamlined with other bank credit ·
in order to ascertain that overall credit ~ansion in the system does not exceed targets
desirable to contain inflationary pressures.
Although NERFUND's projection of financing up to 200 projects in 1990 turned out to be
unrealistic, the achievements so far, particularly the dynamjsm with which the scheme is being
implemented are indicative ~t NERFUND would be a veritable engine.of bridging substantially, the gap in th~ financing needs of SMEs. To attain the sucess rate recorded in countries
such India however, may require outright subsidy of SMEs,'by the Federal Government,
particularly of those in the "small scale" category which NASSI represents. The implementa·tion of NERFUND scheme however, would require some fine-tuning to ensure that the
scheme accomplishes all the desired objectives.
PART IV
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
This paper examined the National Economic Reco~truction Fund (NERFUND), which
is one of the specialised financing facilities for promoting SMEs. Given the importance of
SMEs in the industrialisation process, particularly in the areas of employment generating
activities and developement of indigenous technology, the effectiveness• or otherwise of a
scheme such as NERFUND is of major interest. Tlie paper examined the objectives and the
operational modality of NERFUND, the problems in implementing the scheme, the achievement so far and the prospects of the scheme..
NERFUND's major role was· stated to be the provision of relatively soft, medium to
long-tern funds to SMEs through participating banks (PBs). NERFUND was found to
experience some initial constraints such as the reluctance by banks in participating in the
scheme, owning tothe issue of their bearing all tlie credit risk burden, conditionalities attached
to some of NERFUND's funds and criticism on the composition of NERFUND's management. SMEs were also noted to have their own inherent problems, limiting their access to
institutionalise credit.
·
These problems notwithstanding, NERFUND had approved by the end of May 1991, 120
projects wo~ N504 million and had made disbursements totalliilg over NlOO million. NERFUND was found to have approved a wide range of projects nationwide although the
disbursements lagged far behind the approvals. Approved projects were estimated to have the
potential of boosting employment by more than 6,000 people. Given the commitment of the
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Federal Government to the promotion of SMEs and confident of the s:upport of international
financial institutions such as the ADB and the world Bank, NERFUND is expected to play a
lead role in the financing of SMEs.
NERFUND's impact could however be· grossly undermined if its management is
politicised, whereby the criteria for project selection may cease to be on economic grounds.
Concluding, in the w~rds of the Nigerian head of state and Commander-in-Clilef of the
Armed Forces-President Ibrahim Babangida_at the inception of the scheme, "NERFUND,
is not another cake sharing exercise. It is designed to aid in the cake-baking process, and as
such, fund disbursements by NERFUND will be based on competitive efficiency". Adherence
to this principle should steer NERFUND along.the desired path of economic reconstruction,
recovery and growth. Streamlining NERFUND's activities with other similar schemes, such
as the SME Apex Unit Loan Scheme should further consolidate activities aimed at promoting
SMEs.

Phillips
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Table 1
NERFUND: SUMMARY OF PROJECTS ON STATE BASIS AND
EXPECTEDEMPLOYMENT GENERATION: MAY 1991
States
1.

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
~

9.
10.
11.
12.

13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

Abuja
Akwa lbom State
Anambra State
Bauchi State
Bendel State
Benue State
Borno State
Cross River State
Gongola State
Imo State
Kaduna State
Kano State
Katsina State
Kwara State
Lagos State
Niger State
Ogun State
Ondo State
Oyo State
Plateau· State
River State
Sokoto State
TOTAL

No. of Projects

l
2
18
2
10
1
6
2

11.
4

5
2
3
18
3
13
9
3
3
3
1
120

Projects' Estimate
N-

NERFs Contribution
N-

Projected Employment

10,700,000.00
18,470,000.00.
14_1,543,002.00
10,983,000.00
85,504,907.00
8,714,600.00
28,564,995.60

5,800,000.00
11,855,572.00
84,797,319.00
4,797,000.00
42,792,752.00
5,656,600.00
17,134J)()O.OO

33
94
1129
75

8,386,000.00
80,792,084.00
29,620,765.00
54,803,887.00
32;118,755.00
12,959,000.00
121,719,081.00
10,078,000.00
103,390,505.00
64,084,100.00
20,893,773.00
31,325,000.00
19,327,000.00
9,750,000.00
903,728,454.00

5,260,000.00
47,295,790.00
18,614,569.00
29,441,853.00
19,263,000.00
7,839,000.00
75,804,562.00
7,628,000.00
57,061,558.00
37,062,944.00
5,622,810.00
10,618,000.00
9,094,000.00
6,280,840,00
504,871,576.90

72
658
152
300
171
149
822
122
715
398
84
208
88

Source: The Nfltiional Economic Reconstruction Fund Secretariat.

555
64
310

55
6254

Table 2
THE NATIONAL ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION FUND: SCHEDULE OF PROJECT ON WHICH
DISBURSEMENTS WERE MADE AS AT END MAY 1991
No.

Project Title

u,cation

Product

Cotton Ginning Company of

Nigeria Ltd.

Kankara
Katsina

Agro-Allied
(Ginning)

Niger Garments Manufacturing

Aba

Agro-Allied
(Garmenting)

3.

Noli Eterprises Limited

4.

Betty Pride Limited

1.

2.

Fembo Nigeria Limited

~

US$1,668.459.00

Total

Disbursement to date
FC

12,263.459.00

US$1,668,459.00

All machines have
been imported due
be commissioned in
May 1991

1MB

LC

4.267.000.00

US$592,533.00

Commissioned

NIDB

Onitsha

Agro-Allied D Ml,050,000.00
(Maize Snack)

305,000.00

4,400,000.00

US$626,865.6 7

305,000.00 Commissioned

NIDB

lsolo

Textile
(Garmenting)

PB 168,850.00

473,131.00

2,918,556.00

US$293,361.28

473,131.00 Commissioned

Commerce

DM 660,918.46

1,614,000.00

3,902,000.00

US$394,578.51

803,000.0u

8,405,000.00

US$1,605,306.00

-

740,000.00

2,564,540.00

USS242,200.00

SUS486,602.20
4,262,750.00

2,484,000.00
7,252,750.00

6,214,000.00
. 4,252,750.00

PB183,470.0

448,000.00

3,200,000.00

US$177.051.00

4.167.165.00

5,583,573.00

Akure

6.

Lapkob Nigeria Limited

7.

His Stripes Shoes Component Umule
Imo

Abeotuta
Ogun

Bank

Agro-Allied
(Ethanol)
Minning

USSl,065,306.00

Chemical PVC USS242,200.00

Nishan Transcontinental
Services Limited

Woji,P.H. Chemical
Riven
Kaolin

9.

Pilroad Nigeria Limited

Benin

Reportedly commenced NWMB
production first week of
April, 1991.

197.768.00 Commsioned

Apo-Allied

4,252,750.00 Factoiy Building
nearing completion.

UBA

Agro-Allied
V.Oil

I

Alpha

Union
Foreign currency
disbursed but refunded Bank

Bendel
Agege
Lagos

NIDB

Shoe Sole

8.

Osipo Foods Limited

Bank

233,000.00

Ondo

10.

Remarks

DM 493,360.00
BPll0,599.00
YlS,825,466.00

Imo

Lagos

s:

Amount from
NERFUND
FC
LC

USSl 77,051.00

3,875,775.95 Most machineiy have
loan disbursed on site
and are being installed
as of 9/12/90

MBA

Location

Product

11.

Savanna Exports

Ile-Oluji
Ondo

Agro-Allied

12.

Femsola Nigeria Limited

lgbotako

13.

Kotiko Gold Nigeria Limited Mainland
Lagos

14.

No.

Project Title

Amount from
NERFUND
FC
LC
US$868,630.00

Total

Disbursement to date
FC

Remarks

Bank

LC

-

1,336,000.00

8,258,000.00

Agro-Allied
Hot Water
Cassava
Starch

2.100,000.00

2,100,000.00

2,100,000.00 In Production

Premier C. Ban

Textiles
Garmenting

400,000.00

400,000.00

400.000.00 In Production

Nationwide
Merchant Bank

Oil & Allied Products Co. Ltd . Ijebu-Ode Agro-Allied
V.Oil
Ogun

3,500,000.00

3,500,000.00

3.402,658. 74 Some of the
machineryhave been
delivered on site
as of inspection
date 29-3-91.
Partial production

Abacus
Merchant Bank

US$868,630.00

~

Awaiting Machine

Commerce
Bank

15.

Zanako Nigeria Limited

Gashua

Rice Milling

BP 68,887

862,691.00

1,783,000.00

1,422,692.00

Premier C. Ban:

16.

Amariya Foods Limited

Lafia
Plateau

Rice Milling

DM422,000
(Naira Equivalent)

2,562,100.00

4,729,944.80

3,886,457.46 Machinery installed
4,077,010.10 and awaiting trial run
as of inspection date
22-11-90 ready for
commissioning.

NIDB

17.

Ben-Reubens Nigeria Ltd

lkeja
Lagos

Chemical
Mosquite

US$342,500.00

2,430,000.00

5,143,000.00

US$342,500.00

1,991.471.00 Some of the
machinery imported
are being cleared

Universal
Trust Bank Ltd

DM 1,333,000

2,197,500.00

8,862,500.00

US$871,694.41

5,000,000.00

5,000,000.00

Coils

at Wharf
Plastic

18.

Benaplastic Industries

19.

AAT Chemical Industries Ltd Ijebu-Ode . Chemical
Ogun

Lagos

Machinery still being
fabricated. Factory site
shifted from Lagos to
Awka ,Anambra State

Savannah
Bank Ltd

4,310,000.00 Machineries installed
Continental
and awaiting final run
Merchant Bank
as of inspection date: 15-3-91

No.

Project Titlc

Location

Product

Amount from

Total

Disbursement to date

Remarks

Bank

NERFUND
FC
20.

Sarto Industries Limited

Ibadan
Oyo

Garmenting

21.

Marban Limited

Lagos.

Asphalt

BP586,344
PB240,920

22.

Nimco Concrete Roofing

GuNm

Chemical

23.

Mitchelson NigeriaLimited

Umuahia
Imo

Com Flour

24.

Silverbond Company Ltd

Agege

Beverage

25.

Fabest lndustriesNig. Ltd

Bakale
Oyo

26.
27.

FC

LC
1,000,000.00

1,000,000.00

7,680,75S.OO

USSl,160,961.12
USS477,021

LC
963,470.00

DevconMercl
Bank Limited
Production reportedly

1,610,000.00

4,742,000.00

2,635,000.00

5,980,000.00

600,000.00

600,000.00

Agro-Allied
Starch

1,500,000.00

1,500,000.00

1,500,000.00

Continental
Bank

Hakane Nigeria Limited

P/Harcourt Agro-Allied
Rivers

1,350,000.00

1,350,000.00

1,350,000.00 Machineiy imported
and now being cleared

Continental
Merchant Ba

Sacco Nigeria Limited

Kuye

1,350,000.00

1,350,000.00

1,350,000.00 Most assets financed
Universal T
have been delivered on Bank
site as of date of
inspection

Chemical Soap
Detergent
Cosmetics

750,000.00

750,000.00

Amuwo
Lagos

~

Agro-Allied
Prickly heat
Powder&

408,804.53 Machinei:y cleared

UTB

5,182,848.10
600.000.00 Production

NIDB
Cooperative
Commerce
Nationwide
Merc.hant Ba

28.

Higenik Products Limited

29.

Invar Chemical & Enginerring Aba
Company Limited
Imo

Agro-Allied
US$494,671.00
Limestone (Ground)

423,000.00

5,709,000.00

30.

Cawaan (Nig,) Ltd

Odogun
Ondo

Agro-Allied
V.Oil

385,000.00

385,000.00

31.

O'Blue Bird United (W .A.)
Limited

Orji-Uratta Toothpicks
Imo

US$363, 750.00

125,00.000

3,035,000.00

US$363, 750.00

32.

Deagbo Industries Limited

Agro-Allied

USSl 76,744.00

1,708,858.00

3122,810.00

US$76,744.00

WemaBank

33.

Cosmos Nigeria Limited

Ibadan
Oyo
Otta
Ogun

Agro-Allied
Starch

USSS00,250.00

500,000.00

4,502,000.00

USSS00,250.00

Commerce

Nasarawa
Plateau

750,000.00 Some of the machineiy NAL
delivered and production
going on as of inspection date
US$494,671.00
BP 85,550.00

NIDB
385,000.00 Production

NIDB

CCB

No.

34.

Project Title

GodwiJ,l Kris Industries Ltd

Location

Product

Umudim

Agro-Allied

Anambra

lnliertubc for
car and light
:vehicle

35.

Forestville lndusirics Limited Owo
Ondo

36.

Sai:ki Nigeria Umited

Agro-Allied
Wooden
Flooring

Amount from
NERFUND
FC
LC.

Total

Disbursement to date
FC

LC

807,480.00

8,337,000.00

US$941,190.00

CCB

.BP 442,395.50

994,000.00

9,288,916.00.

BP 413,090.00

NIDB

300,000.00

300,000.00

Maiduguri Furniture

300,000.00 All machines financed · Savannah
have been delivered and
installed. Production in
full swing as of inspection
date 26/4/91.

~· Ben-Gill Company Limited

Bank

US$940,00.00

Bomo

37.

Remarks

AbakaJlild Agro-Allied
Anambra Rice

BP 311,117.00

525,000.00

5,568,198.00

US$274,040.00

1,042,000.00

3,533,000.00

2,000,000.00

~.000,000.00

2,000,000.00

i
Continental
Merchant Bank

300,00.00

300,000.00

2,750,000.00

Abacus Mercha1

4,901,000.00

4,901,000.00

2,661,000.00

Ivory Merchant
Danit Limited.

38.

Bizcontact Limited

Okpara
Bendel

Apo-Allied
PalmIQ:mel
Oil

39.

Highland Steel and Allied
lridustries

Jo6
Plateau

·Welding
Electronics

40.

Max and Kelly Nigeria Ltd.

Obaile
Abare

Crude Palm
Kerne~

41.

Osco Agro-Allied lndustty

Ondo
Umuahia

Vegetable Oil

4,683,235.49
US$273,SOO.OO

NIDB
NIDB

